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I. INTRODUCTION
“To put the world in order, we must first put the nation in order; to
put the nation in order, we must first put the family in order; to put the
family in order, we must first cultivate our personal life.”1
- Confucius
While Confucius was decidedly not commenting on the law of
intestacy and succession, his words help frame an age-old debate about
who should inherit wealth and for what purpose. A study of intestacy
systems invariably exists at the intersection of the state, the family, and
the individual. Naturally, review of such systems helps lay bare a
society’s values and ambitions.
The law of succession often encompasses two interdependent, yet
conflicting themes: the support function and testamentary freedom.2
Broadly speaking, civil law inheritance schemes like China have opted
to emphasize support provisions to ensure the welfare of their collective
community.3 These provisions are meant to function on two fronts: to
help support a surviving dependent at the decedent’s death and to help
encourage support of the decedent during life.4
Conversely, common law jurisdictions like the United States stress
testamentary freedom—the idea that each individual has the right to
dispose of her property how she sees fit, at death.5 American courts will
enforce the presumed intent of the individual testator, even if at odds
with society’s notion of justice or commonsense.6 Like support,
testamentary freedom also functions on two fronts. On one hand, rigid
judicial interpretation of laws may prevent the passing of property to a
deserving loved-one; on the other, too much judicial discretion may lead
to the intestate hijacking of a decedent’s wealth.7
The battle lines are drawn on each side of the Pacific: collective
socialism versus capitalistic individualism. But that would be an oversimplification of the debate. In fact, both systems, despite their vast
differences, share the common goal of providing support for their

1. KATHLEEN TRACY, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CONFUCIUS 4 (Mitchell Lane
Publishers, Inc. 2005). Confucius was a philosopher, politician, and legalist of the Ming
dynasty in China. He championed filial loyalty as an ideal and functional basis for society.
Id.
2. See infra Sections III.A, III.D.
3. See infra Section III.D.
4. See infra Section III.D.
5. See infra Section III.A.
6. See infra Section III.A.
7. See infra Section III.A.

7_BROWN FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

YIN AND YANK INTESTACY

4/6/2019 5:19 PM

241

respective populations while ensuring testamentary freedom.8 Indeed,
instead of battle lines, the relationship may be more accurately described
as yin and yang. Or yin and yank, to borrow from the title of this Note.
Ultimately, this debate is not about picking sides but about picking
reforms. We can have our cake and eat it too.
This Note supports the contention that the United States can and
should adopt more support-based measures without sacrificing
testamentary freedom. Part II provides a brief background of Western
intestacy law,9 while Part III analyzes in-depth the divide between
American and Chinese intestacy law.10 Specifically, Part III examines
the inherent status-based biases of the American system and the
shortfalls of presumed majoritarian intent, ultimately leading to a
discussion of unworthy heirs.11 Then, it explores the complexities of
China’s behavior-based system, analyzing both forced heirship
provisions and family maintenance schemes.12 Finally, Part III reviews
case law, first in China and then in the U.S.13 Part IV of this Note
presents the issues facing American law today, including the lack of
support, under-inclusive statutory language, perverse incentives for
unworthy heirs and lack of judicial discretion.14 Lastly, Part V concludes
that the benefits of the American system are outweighed by its human
costs.15 I propose tipping the scale in favor of merit and need-based
inheritance in the United States.
II. BACKGROUND
The law of succession dates back millennia.16 To avoid violent
conflict for property after death, ancient laws of distribution were
developed over time.17 As far back as Roman law, we see evidence of
property schemes to ensure proper distribution of a decedent’s estate,
whereby succession might extend as far as the sixth collateral line.18

8. See infra Section III.D.
9. See infra Section II.
10. See infra Section III.
11. See infra Sections III.A, III.B, III.C.
12. See infra Sections III.D.
13. See infra Sections III.E, III.F, III.G, III.H, III.I.
14. See infra Section IV.
15. See infra Section V.
16. 2 William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 11-12.
17. Id. at 4. Blackstone notes that the “good order of the world [would be] continually
broken and disturbed, while a variety of persons were striving who should get the first
occupation of the same thing.” Id.
18. David V. DeRosa, Intestate Succession and the Laughing Heir: Who Do We Want to
Get the Last Laugh?, 12 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 153, 155 (1997).
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In the medieval Dark Ages of Europe, the practice of
primogeniture19 took hold, thereby imposing a far stricter system on the
passing of property. Whereas the Romans made no distinction of age or
gender, medieval titleholders passed their property to first sons, at the
exclusion of all younger siblings.20 By limiting the pool of potential
heirs, primogeniture led to the conception of escheat. In the event the
property could not pass to a viable heir, the title would revert to the
feudal lord.21 The rationale for escheat is simple and enduring. Where
there is no heir, the state shall take possession of property to ensure
peace, order, and efficiency.22 While primogeniture has dissipated into
the annals of history, the English common law has retained the rule of
escheat.23
III. TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM OR SUPPORT?
A. American Inheritance Model
Western countries have long promoted freedom of testation.24 The
notion that it is an individual’s birthright to determine the distribution of
her property after death has drawn scholars since the passage of the
Statute of Wills in sixteenth century England.25 Natural rights
proponents maintain that the creation of wealth entitles a person to freely
distribute that property, while Bentham Utilitarians point to the
incentives to create and save furnished by such a scheme.26
Although testamentary freedom remains a fundamental tenant of
American law and society, such a right has never been found in the
federal Constitution.27 Thus, the job of regulating inheritance has fallen
to the states, which have a “broad authority to adjust the rules governing
the descent and devise of property.”28 Despite this mandate, state
19. Primogeniture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
20. DeRosa, supra note 18, at 155-56.
21. Escheat, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
22. 2 WILLIAMS BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *10-11. Blackstone describes the
state’s interest: “In case he neglects to dispose of it, or is not permitted to make any disposition
at all, the municipal law of the country then steps in, and declares who shall be the successor,
representative, or heir of the deceased; that is, who alone shall have the right to enter upon
this vacant possession, in order to avoid the confusion which it’s becoming again common
would occasion.” Id.
23. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-105 (2010).
24. Seymour Moskowitz, Adult Children and Indigent Parents: Intergenerational
Responsibilities in International Perspective, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 449 (2002).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 (1987) (finding that restrictions on inheritance
did not implicate the Just Compensation Clause).
28. Id.
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legislatures have been reluctant to restrict testamentary freedom,
preferring instead to pass rigid laws promoting a “dead hand” rule.29
Accordingly, distribution of any particular estate has been subject to
inflexible rules of inheritance, which value family status over any
objective assessment on merit or need of a beneficiary.30
The rationale behind this rigid approach is one of predictability.31
By sticking fast to ironclad rules of succession, the mathematics of estate
planning should theoretically be consistent over time, avoiding
protracted litigation, unsettled law, and emotional hardship for surviving
claimants.32 Moreover, the intestacy regime is supported by presumed
majoritarian intent.33 Essentially, the question being answered is,
“[h]ow would most people like their estate distributed in default, in the
unfortunate event of their death?”34 Overwhelmingly, lawmakers in the
United States believe that most individuals would want their property to
pass to their surviving spouse, their issue, and finally their collateral, in
that order.35 If no viable heir can be determined, the property passes to
the state, escheat representing the ultimate default.36
But, is this truly the presumed American intent? A system
eschewing the traditional, fixed-rule model may narrow the gap between
presumed intent and actual intent by considering such things as past
relationships and financial need, but at what cost to efficiency?
Testamentary intent is a double-edged sword and ultimately, it is
fundamentally restricted by the tyranny of majoritarian thinking.
B. The Family Paradigm
Some scholars have been quick to point out the inherent biases of
the American system. Professor Lawrence Friedman observed that
succession laws function as a “genetic code of society.”37 Such laws
may seek to maintain the status quo by ensuring that each generation
replicates its predecessor.38 Thus, the principle function of United States
intestacy law is to “maintain and perpetuate the social unit that
29. Moskowitz, supra note 24, at 449.
30. Id at 450. Generally, inheritance is restricted to the decedent’s closest relatives by
blood or marriage.
31. Thomas E. Simmons, A Chinese Inheritance, 30 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J., 124, 128
(2017).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE, in
DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 9, 14 (Edward C. Halbach Jr. ed. 1977).
38. Id.
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Americans have traditionally deemed essential for a stable and
productive society—the nuclear family unit.”39 This inert focus on the
immediate family may represent a failure of American lawmakers to
adapt to the changing lifestyles of an increasingly diverse society. More
than anything, the Family Paradigm40 may be failing Americans in a vital
function of intestacy: support.
Over the past thirty years, American legislators have proffered a
vision of a public welfare system less reliant on the government and
more reliant on private actors, specifically the family unit, as a
mechanism for the support of dependents.41 In theory, American
inheritance law performs this crucial welfare function by encouraging
those with wealth to provide for their survivors.42 In practice, however,
the rigid Family Paradigm may have caused more harm to dependents
than advantage, such that “when support conflicts with family
preservation, support yields.”43
American law restricts succession to “the natural object of the
decedent’s bounty.”44 Such a maxim necessarily limits inheritance to
filial sanguinity at the expense of any merit or support-based
considerations. Thus, a decedent’s closest relatives automatically
inherit, irrespective of their need or past relationship with the decedent.45
Generally, this remains the case even if the heir abandoned or physically
abused the decedent.46 If no “close” family members exist, the law
typically ignores extended family members, caregivers, long-term
dependents and friends to confer a windfall on distant relatives.47 Such
heirs may have never met the decedent, and yet they are “laughing” all
the way to the bank instead of the non-relative suffering a sense of loss
and who may have supported the decedent for years.48 Although the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) has sought to limit the issue of “laughing

39. Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199,
204 (2001).
40. Id. Frances Foster asserts that the law of intestacy in the United States is primarily
concerned with the preservation and perpetuation of the traditional American family unit at
the expense of support-based functions and refers to this systemic injustice as the Family
Paradigm. Id.
41. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
42. Foster, supra note 39, at 205.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 207.
45. Id. at 205.
46. Id. at 207.
47. Id. at 206-07.
48. DeRosa, supra note 18, at 158.

7_BROWN FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

YIN AND YANK INTESTACY

4/6/2019 5:19 PM

245

heirs” by restricting inheritance to the second collateral line,49 some
jurisdictions remain steadfast to the common law.50 The fact that
“laughing heirs” somehow satisfy the “natural object of the decedent’s
bounty” standard, while stepchildren or committed partners do not, is
proof enough that the Family Paradigm needs rethinking.51 Nor is the
bias confined to intestacy.
Indeed, donative freedom can be illusory even when opting out of
the default majoritarian intestacy scheme.52 This issue is especially
pronounced when the testator tries to leave property to those outside the
immediate family through wills or will substitutes.53 In theory, the
guiding practice is testamentary intent, but in practice such intent
quickly yields to the pressures of the Paradigm. The below examples
illustrate this point.
1. Wrinkles in the Family Paradigm
a. Capacity
Courts often massage mental capacity doctrines such as “insane
delusion” and “undue influence” to reach results consistent with
society’s notion of the proper, traditional family.54 For example, one of
the prongs of mental capacity is that the testator knows the persons that
are the “natural object[s] of his or her bounty.”55 Thus, if the will omits
or even misnames “natural objects”—essentially family members—it is
likely to be denied probate on mental capacity grounds.56
Furthermore, the support function is in fact chilled by such
practices. Proof of long-term support and care of the decedent suggests
that a “confidential relationship” exists between the decedent and her

49. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (2010). Under UPC 2-103(a)(4), the most remote
heirs to the estate would be descendants of the decedent’s grandparents, including
grandparents, aunts, uncles, and first cousins. No other remote heirs have claim to the estate,
or standing to challenge a will. Id.
50. DeRosa, supra note 18, at 164.
51. See DeRosa, supra note 18; Foster, supra note 39, at 210.
52. E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 275, 276 (1999).
53. Id. Spitko explains that this bias “imperils any estate plan that disfavors the testator’s
legal spouse or close blood relations in favor of non-family beneficiaries.” Id.
54. Foster, supra note 39, at 210; Spitko, supra note 52, at 283 (positing that such
doctrines are “sufficiently nebulous that they enable the fact-finder to rewrite the testator’s
estate plan in accordance with societal norms”).
55. Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of Testamentary
Capacity, 51 VILL. L. REV. 25, 31 (2006).
56. Powell v. Conner, Case No. CA85-04-020, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5241 (Jan. 13,
1986).
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caregiver.57 Evidence of a “confidential relationship” can lead to a
presumption against the bequest, forcing the claimant to bear the burden
of proving that the relationship was not exploitative of the indisposed
testator.58
b. Anti-Lapse Statutes
Common law lapse rules only further the biases of the system.59 In
the widespread situation whereby a decedent fails to update her will and
consequently makes a bequest to an heir who predeceases her, that
bequest will fail rather than passing to the heirs of the predeceased
(unless explicitly stipulated in the will).60 Such a result, in most cases,
is wholly inconsistent with the presumed intent of the testator.61 While
most jurisdictions have adopted anti-lapse provisions, consistent with
the amended UPC, the exception only serves to reinforce the Family
Paradigm.62
Anti-lapse laws substitute another taker for the
predeceased, in effect saving the will, but only in cases where the
predeceased was a blood relative, survived and represented by issue.63
Once again, non-relatives and caretakers are out of luck.
c. Judicial Interpretation and Omitted Heirs
Moreover, despite the common refrain that courts want to avoid
intestacy at all costs, judges usually employ rules of strict compliance to
invalidate ambiguous or incomplete wills.64 If a decedent fails to update
a will after a marriage, divorce or the birth of a child, courts presume
oversight and instead opt to funnel the bequest through the intestacy
scheme.65 Omitted spouse statutes reward post-will spouses with an
intestacy share while pretermitted heir statutes reward post-will issue.66
Even upon divorce, the law presumes severed ties and nullifies the will
through revocation based on the idea that a divorced spouse is no longer
a “natural object of the decedent’s bounty.”67
57. Foster, supra note 39, at 212.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 213.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Foster, supra note 39, at 213-14.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 212-13.
65. Id. at 214.
66. Id.
67. Peevy v. Mutual Servs. Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.W.2d 120, 123 (1984) (where an exwife lost entitlement to support because of a determination that most ex-wives would not be
a “natural object of decedent’s bounty”); the Uniform Probate Code also revokes “any
disposition or appointment created by law or in a governing instrument to a relative of the
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Generally, as evidenced by the above examples, American courts
provide little latitude in determining what is “natural” when it comes to
probating wills. As a result, “the sacred canon of will construction, the
‘presumption against intestacy,’ is effectively nullified by the ‘equally
potent’ presumption that an intestate heir can be disinherited only by
plain words.”68
d. “Natural” Relationships
A necessary implication of the American inheritance system is that
some human relationships are not on equal footing with others—that
only some associations matter.69 By promulgating the traditional
American family, the system “declares ‘unnatural’ the very relationships
that many people, but most frequently ethnic and cultural minorities
often experience as ‘natural’—caring relationships with extended family
members, nonmarital partners, close friends and nonrelated
caregivers.”70 Extended care systems have long been a cultural norm for
numerous minority communities within the United States.71 By choice
or necessity, many children are now raised by extended family members
or other non-legal caregivers.72 Such relationships are not recognized
under American intestacy law, which effectively subordinates ethnic
differences and promotes the traditional American family, at the expense
of care and support.73
While the Paradigm seeks to promote support within the immediate
family through a presumed majoritarian intent, a considerable portion of
the population is excluded from the pool of potential heirs. Such a result
is difficult to reconcile from both a moral and economic standpoint.
Instead of incentivizing good behavior, the Family Paradigm sanctions
inheritance by “unworthy heirs.”74

divorced individual’s former spouse.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)(1)(A) (amended
2010).
68. Foster, supra note 39, at 213.
69. Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM.
L. 691, 694 (arguing that the non-traditional family is no different from the traditional family
and questioning why some non-traditional relationships, based on sexual status or human
rights status are not considered “natural” or legal).
70. Foster, supra note 39, at 245.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 246.
73. Id.
74. See Moskowitz, supra note 24, at 401 (relating “the bitterness of abandonment”
experienced by indigent parents at the whims of adult children).
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C. Unworthy Heirs
Like the meek, the undeserving often inherit the earth, at least in
the United States.75 There is only one widespread exception to
inheritance by “unworthy heirs:” the Slayer Rule.76 Under Slayer
Statutes, if an heir kills the decedent, the heir’s status as taker is
extinguished.77 The Uniform Probate Code formulates the Slayer Rule
as follows:
An individual who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent
forfeits all benefits under this [article] with respect to the decedent’s
estate, including an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted
spouse’s or child’s share, a homestead allowance, exempt property,
and a family allowance. If the decedent died intestate, the decedent’s
intestate estate passes as if the killer disclaimed his [or her] intestate
share.78

The forfeiture of inheritance under the Slayer Rule may, at first
glance, come across as punishment for the killer’s wrongful conduct.
This was the case at common law, where judges applied the underlying
notion that wrongdoers should not be allowed to profit from their
wrongdoing.79 However, modern scholars largely recognize that Slayer
Statutes are “designed to preserve the integrity of [the] property-transfer
system by preventing a person from altering, by means of a wrongful
slaying, the course of property succession as intended by the source of
the property.”80 Thus, the Slayer exception does not exist for punitive
purposes in discouraging “unworthy heirs,” but merely serves to effect
the decedent’s presumed intent.
As it exists, the Slayer exception is very narrow, only covering
intentional killings.81 Indeed, the heir who abandoned, ridiculed, libeled,
abused, or even tortured the decedent could still inherit, so long as the
heir was not a direct cause of the decedent’s death.82 Accordingly, many
reformers recommend expanding the unworthy heir doctrine to penalize

75. Matthew 5:5 (King James). “Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.”
Id.
76. Simmons, supra note 31, at 129.
77. Id.
78. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b) (2010).
79. Richard Lewis Brown, Undeserving Heirs?—The Case of the “Terminated” Parent,
40 U. RICH. L. REV. 547, 558 (2006). The Slayer Rule first appeared as the application of the
equitable maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria (“no one shall take
advantage of his own wrong”). Id.
80. Id. at 559.
81. Simmons, supra note 31, at 129.
82. Id.
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not only “slayers,” but also heirs that inadequately supported the
decedent.83
The human costs of this strict, status-based scheme are readily
apparent. A system that prizes blood above need, affection, or conduct
may intrinsically result in injustice.84 Unworthy heirs can, and do,
inherit.85 Such a paradigm allows a son to inherit from a father he has
ignored for thirty years; it allows a daughter to inherit from a mother
who she has refused to provide care for in her parent’s struggle with a
terminal illness; it paints sympathetic and supportive neighbors as
swindlers and exploitation artists.86 Assuredly, a father could even
inherit insurance payouts or wrongful death claims from a deceased
daughter he sexually abused.87 Surely, society can do better than
allowing wrongdoers to inherit from their victims. Is expanding the
“unworthy heirs” doctrine enough to deter misconduct and encourage
support? Or must we overhaul the entire Family Paradigm?
Some reformers advocate the “behavior-based model of
succession,” in which courts are permitted to deviate from strict statusbased definitions in cases of good and bad behavior.88 Contingent on
conduct, a judge has the power to deny inheritance rights to even the
closest relative.89 For those reformers, China represents a more ideal
model of intestacy, where support functions and conduct are linked with
inheritance.
D. China’s Behavior-Based Model
China’s legal history dates back thousands of years to a time when
the country was ruled by “ethics based law that blended dynastic codes
with Confucian principles.”90 Confucian law developed around two
principles: belief in the nobleman (jūn zï) and the formation of a wellordered society.91 Traditionally, the term “jūn zï” referred to men of
noble birth.92 Confucius, however, reformulated the notion of a
nobleman, asserting that such nobility was achieved through merit, not
83. Foster, supra note 39, at 230, 234.
84. See Foster, supra note 39.
85. Id. at 240.
86. Id.
87. Paula Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?,
49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 260 (1994); Foster, supra note 39, at 240.
88. See id.
89. Foster, supra note 39, at 230-31.
90. Simmons, supra note 31, at 124.
91. Aris Teon, Law in Imperial China—Confucianism and Legalism, GREATER CHINA
J. (May 7, 2016), https://china-journal.org/2016/05/07/law-in-imperial-china-confucianismlegalism/.
92. Id.
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birth.93 A nobleman exhibits humanity, virtue, and righteousness.94
Perhaps most importantly, in order to establish a “well-ordered society,”
a nobleman must practice filial piety.95 Indeed, most of Confucian law
was not codified but was instead ritualistic, practiced ideally through the
five human relationships of father-son, husband-wife, sibling-sibling,
friend-friend, and ultimately, ruler-subject.96 Without codified laws, a
ruler led his people with virtue, creating a sense of shame to prevent
unwanted conduct.97
The contemporary laws of inheritance, in contrast, are quite fresh.
Roy Girasa provides a brief history:
From 1949 to 1957, after abolishing all laws enacted by the
[nationalist] government, a few laws were passed dealing with law
reform, marriage and trade unions. Judges had to decide cases in
accordance with governmental policy . . . Anarchy reigned during
the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The death
of Mao in 1976 led to significant reforms . . . Legislation was drafted
and enacted that lent some credibility to the rule of law within
China.98

China opened to the world in 1979,99 followed by the adoption of a
new constitution in 1982100 and the contemporary Law of Succession in
1985.101 China’s engagement with the world has led to substantial
changes to and experimentation with the law of succession within the
country.102 Despite the passage of time, however, it remains evident that
China’s Confucian past shapes its present, as the government looks to
establish a “well-ordered society” through intestacy.103
Over the past thirty years, both China and the United States. have
engaged in striking overhauls of their welfare and support networks.104
Surprisingly, in its drive to modernize, China seems to share a common
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. TUNG-TSU CHU, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 280 (1965).
98. Roy J. Girasa, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in China, 20 WESTCHESTER B.J. 305,
305 (1993).
99. Simmons, supra note 31, at 125.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model From China,
1999 WIS. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (1999) [hereinafter Linking Support and Inheritance].
104. Id.; see also Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (containing extensive enforcement
measures of child support obligations and referencing the responsibility of the able-bodied to
work and the prudence of the poor to not give birth to children they cannot support).
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goal with its capitalist rival across the Pacific Ocean in pushing for
reform.105 Both countries are theoretically attempting to shift the burden
of welfare from government to the private sector, specifically targeting
the family as a mechanism for support of dependents.106 Essentially,
China and the United States alike seek to promote individual
responsibility and dispel any notion of a legal right to cradle-to-grave
public welfare.107 The means taken to achieve this goal, however,
diverge starkly.108 In its reform effort, China has turned to the tool of
succession law to activate private support of dependents by linking
inheritance with merit.109
In contrast to American succession law, China recognizes
“dependence as the gravamen of inheritance,” where the passing of
property operates through need rather than entitlement.110 If an
individual dies intestate, courts (representing the decedent) have
considerable discretion in allocating property according to her actual
intent, not some imagined majoritarian fiction.111 Whereas an American
testator can “pauperize” his dependents, a Chinese court will invalidate
such disinheritance, utilizing its substantial powers in equity.112
Nonetheless, a testator in China is afforded considerable latitude in
distributing her estate testate.113 The “behavior-based model” explicitly
extends support to any dependent outside the decedent’s immediate
family.114 So, while an empowered court in equity may serve to limit
testamentary freedom, the non-relative provisions under Chinese statute
compensate the testator, ultimately ensuring a closer approximation of
her actual intent. Thus, China’s scheme is one of flexibility, where
successions of estates are tailored according to merit and need.115 This
is accomplished in two ways: forced heirship provisions and family
maintenance schemes.116

105. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1201.
106. Id. at 1200.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1202.
109. Id. at 1203.
110. Id. at 1217.
111. Simmons, supra note 31, at 126.
112. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1217-21 (citing Herbert D.
Laube, The Right of a Testator to Pauperize His Helpless Dependents, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 559
(1928)).
113. See Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1217.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1210.
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1. Forced Heirship Provisions
Forced heirship provisions set aside fixed portions of the decedent’s
estate for qualifying relationships, usually children.117 Shares are
awarded exclusively on the basis of familial status.118 While automatic
shares by definition cannot take into account need or merit, such a
scheme prevents against unjust disinheritance, protecting a vital family
support function at the expense of testamentary freedom. Proponents
view forced heirship as a fix for the disintegrating family in that it binds
inheritance and family support mechanisms.119 Critics view its “fickle
fractions” as arbitrary and too rigid to achieve its support objectives.120
Forced heirship models are common to civil law countries.121 One
American commentator notes, “most of the civilized countries in the
world provide direct protection from disinheritance to children of a
testator.”122 The United States, then, does not qualify as a “civilized
country,” as forced heirship provisions have been rejected in forty-nine
of fifty states.123 In contrast, China has followed the lead of civil law
countries by enacting a mandatory share.124
Article 19 of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) Inheritance
Law provides what is referred to as a “necessary portion” to heirs of an
estate, as long as they are “unable to work” and “have no source of
income.” (emphasis added).125 According to the guidelines of the
Supreme People’s Court, Article 19 has three basic characteristics.126
First, any heir entitled to inherit under intestacy can qualify, so long as
they are unable to work and have no source of income.127 As such, all
117. Id.
118. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1211.
119. Id. at 1212.
120. Id. at 1213.
121. Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
83, 117 (1994).
122. Id. Just a few of the numerous countries around the world to protect children from
complete disinheritance include Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany,
Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland. Id. at 117 n.111.
123. Louisiana, a product of the Napoleonic Codes, is the only civil law jurisdiction in the
nation. The mandatory nature of the share was significantly decreased in the late 1980s, and
now only provides for children under the age of twenty-four. Each child under the age of
twenty-four receives a twenty-five percent mandatory share of the estate. Michael W.
Gilligan, ‘Forced Heirship’ in the United States of America, with Particular Reference to New
York State, 22 TRUST & TRUSTEES, https://www.phillipsnizer.com/pdf/ArticleTrusts_Trustees%20-%20Forced%20heirship%20in%20the%20United%20States%20%20Galligan%20(2016).pdf.
124. Ya-Hui Hsu, Should China Adopt Taiwan’s Mandatory Share Doctrine?, 29 PENN
ST. INT’L L. REV. 289, 291 (2010).
125. Id. at 291-92.
126. Id. at 295.
127. Id.
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intestate heirs are covered, not merely the decedent’s children and
issue.128 Article 19 also encompasses spouses, grandparents, siblings,
needy parents, step relatives, and widowed sons and daughters-in-law.129
Second, if a potential heir qualifies, such that she is unable to work
and without income, there are two prescribed remedies:130 (i) if the estate
is so small that it cannot be split up, the qualifying heir is given the
entirety of the estate and the testator’s contrary bequest is void;131 or (ii)
if the estate is large enough to split up, a qualifying heir under Article 19
must receive his mandatory share first before the testator’s bequest to
other legatees is given effect.132
Finally, the court makes Article 19 determinations at the time the
will becomes effective, not its date of execution.133 In order to qualify
as unable to work and without income, thereby receiving a “necessary
portion,” a potential heir must maintain these conditions through the
death of the testator.134 Likewise, if an heir does not qualify for a share
at the time of execution of the will or will substitute, she may still be
able to meet the requirements upon the testator’s death.135
Accordingly, China’s forced heirship provision, Article 19,
explicitly replaces status with need as the ultimate determination in any
succession of property.136 Such a scheme allows for the support of the
indigent-dependent and generally prohibits unjust disinheritances.
Additionally, as most potential heirs are either able to work or have an
income, Article 19 is muted in its impact on testamentary freedom.137
2. Family Maintenance Schemes
Perhaps the most startling thing about Chinese inheritance law is its
willingness to invoke judicial review of an intestate heir’s conduct in
distributing an estate.138 The family maintenance model allows judges,
on a case-by-case basis, to assess the relative merits of a decedent’s
testamentary bequest and the challenges to that disposition brought by
survivors.139 Take note: the scheme does not apply automatically but

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1222.
Id.
Hsu, supra note 124, at 295.
Id.
Id. at 295-96.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 297.
Hsu, supra note 124, at 297.
Id.
Id.
Simmons, supra note 31, at 125-26.
Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1214.
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rather is only deployed to provide remedies for “qualifying, aggrieved
claimants.”140
This sort of judicial discretion has generated impassioned debate
among American intestacy scholars.141 Proponents find a strong moral
appeal in embedding a legal principle that “familial responsibility does
not terminate at death.”142 They also cite the privatization of social
welfare as a substantial benefit.143 Critics contend that the family
maintenance model introduces unnecessary complexity and
inconsistency into the probate system, thereby promoting litigation,
increasing costs and depleting estates.144 Crucially, detractors claim that
making powerful rules of equity available to judges is incompatible with
American notions of testamentary freedom.145
As referenced above,146 Article 19 of the P.R.C. Inheritance Law
provides qualifying heirs with a “necessary portion” of the estate, but
neither the Chinese legislature nor the judiciary has defined the term.147
Rather, the term has taken shape through past decisions.148 Courts have
determined a “necessary portion” to mean “the amount needed to meet a
qualified heir’s ‘fundamental needs.’ ” 149 While this logically should be
interpreted as reasonable living expense, courts instead look to the size
of the estate and the qualified heir’s subjective standard of living to
determine a distribution.150
Only increasing the discretionary capabilities of Chinese courts is
Article 14 of the P.R.C. Inheritance Law, which extends Article 19 relief
to all of the decedent’s dependents, irrespective of family status.151 In
addition to Article 19’s dual standard of inability to work with no
income, Article 14 imposes an additional burden on the potential heir: it
requires that claimants must have “relied on the decedent’s support.”152
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1213.
142. Id. at 1214.
143. Id.
144. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1215.
145. Id.
146. See supra Section III.D.1.
147. Hsu, supra note 124, at 296.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1226-27. Foster asserts, “[t]o
protect more distant family and nonrelated dependents from disinheritance, China
supplements its forced share scheme with a second, equitable redistribution technique.” Id.
at 1227; Law of Succession of the People’s Republic of China, 1 October 1985, Article 14
[hereinafter P.R.C. Succession Law].
152. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1227; P.R.C. Succession Law
Art. 14.
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Unlike Article 19, Article 14 does not represent a mandatory share but
merely provides a path for aggrieved dependents to claim an
“appropriate” share.153
Once again, the term “appropriate” has necessarily been formulated
by courts on a case-by-case basis, at the behest of the highest court in the
land, the Supreme People’s Court.154 Judges have read Article 14’s
provisions expansively, qualifying not only siblings and distant relatives
but also friends, neighbors and colleagues.155 Essentially, courts are
invited to adjust award valves depending on whether an individual
supported the decedent (merit) or relied on the decedent for support
(need).156
Accordingly, the Chinese family maintenance model recognizes
both support situations and provides awards for the truly deserving or
the truly needy through heightened judicial discretion. This ability of
the court to “place its finger on the scale of intestacy” and consider
“support provided to or received by the decedent,”157 coupled with
Article 19’s forced share provisions, constitutes a powerful model,
whereby China can protect all of a decedent’s dependents, irrespective
of family status.158 The following cases serve to reinforce the support
benefits of such a system, thereby highlighting deficiencies in the
American scheme.
E. Estate of Zhang
Zhang, the decedent, left no statutory heirs, and thus his estate was
in danger of escheat.159 He had previously been married to Ms. Xu,
however, the union only lasted ten years. The marriage produced no
children but while this was Zhang’s first marriage, it was not Xu’s, who
had mothered a son in her previous marriage, Hua Xu. Under Article 10
of the P.R.C. Inheritance Law, stepparents, stepchildren, and stepsiblings are elevated to first-order heirs so long as they had a “support
relationship” with the decedent.160 Here, the court reasoned that Hua Xu
did not qualify as an automatic intestate heir since his status was
153. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1228; P.R.C. Succession Law
Art. 14.
154. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1229. In a broad ruling, the
Court found that an Article 14 claimant “can receive more or less than an intestate share when
the estate is distributed, depending on the specific circumstances.” Id.
155. Id. at 1228.
156. Simmons, supra note 31, at 140.
157. Id. at 126.
158. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1222.
159. Simmons, supra note 31, at 141-42; Case No. 02053 (Beijing First Intermediate
People’s Court, Apr. 20, 2015).
160. P.R.C. Succession Law Art. 10.
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terminated upon the divorce of his mother and the decedent.161
Therefore, his claim of succession rights was entirely contingent on
whether a support relationship existed between him and Zhang, his exstepfather.
Hua Xu was twenty-six years old when his mother married Zhang,
yet he continued to live under their roof. Following the couple’s divorce,
the claimant remained closely associated with the decedent, visiting him
and providing emotional support until his death. When Zhang died, it
was Hua Xu who settled his accounts and made funeral arrangements.
Since Hua Xu had lost his heirship status under Article 19, the Beijing
First Intermediate People’s Court was compelled to exploit the elasticity
of Article 14, ultimately finding that the claimant deserved an
“appropriate” share.162
The facts of this case exist in somewhat of a vacuum, considering
that the estate was destined to escheat.163 Rarely are circumstances so
straightforward in Chinese intestacy. Still, Zhang serves to highlight the
discretion of the P.R.C. Inheritance Law regime. Essentially, there exist
two nets of equity that courts can deploy to catch needy dependents that
fall through the cracks. Having made the determination that Zhang’s
divorce terminated Hua Xu’s Article 19 rights as a stepchild heir, the
court moved on to Article 14, finding that the claimant was “unable to
work,” “without income,” and “dependent on the decedent’s support.”164
While it is not quite clear what compelled the court to find an inability
to work on the part of the claimant, it is likely they applied their equitable
discretion to ensure that the estate would not pass escheat.165 The court’s
final calculation of an “appropriate share” resulted in the passage of the
entire estate to Hua Xu. In American courts, such an allocation for an
ex-stepson is unheard of.166 Indeed, an ex-stepson claimant would not
even have standing to challenge the succession.167

161. The question of whether divorce or death terminates the status of stepchildren has
led to inconsistent results in the Chinese system. Case No. 00590 (Second Mid. People’s Ct.,
Beijing, Feb. 11, 2015) (China) (where the judge found the stepchild status of the claimant
was not terminated by his mother’s death).
162. Id.
163. Simmons, supra note 31, at 141.
164. See id.; P.R.C. Succession Law Art. 14, 19.
165. Simmons, supra note 31, at 142. American courts also have a strong distaste for
escheat, choosing to “enforce it only as a last resort.” See Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery City.
v. Browning 635 A.2d 373, 381 (Md. 1994) (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
166. Foster, supra note 39, at 207.
167. Id. (standing being limited to potential heirs and potential heirs being limited to
“natural objects of a decedent’s bounty”).
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F. Estate of Wang/Estate of Huaan
In 1991, the decedent, Wang Weifa, died of cancer, leaving four
first-order heirs: his wife, his ten-year-old daughter, and his parents.168
First-order heirs are covered under Article Thirteen of the P.R.C.
Inheritance Law:
Successors same in order shall, in general, inherit in equal shares. At
the time of distributing the estate, due consideration shall be given
to successors who are unable to work and have special financial
difficulties . . . [S]uccessors who have made the predominant
contributions in maintaining the decedent or have lived with the
decedent may be given a larger share . . . [S]uccessors who had the
ability and were in a position to maintain the decedent but failed to
fulfill their duties shall be given no share or a smaller share of the
estate.169

Here, the decedent’s parents were elderly, infirm, and without
income.170 Likewise, the daughter was without income and unable to
work, as she was school-aged.171 Pursuant to its equitable powers under
Article 13, the court gave “due consideration” to the especially desperate
circumstances and awarded the daughter and both parents larger than
intestate shares, at the expense of the healthy spouse’s portion.172 The
judge explained that Article 13 “reflects our country’s inheritance
system’s basic principle of supporting the elderly and raising the
young.”173
This result is common in the Chinese system, as courts regularly
cite Article 13 to reapportion shares to the neediest heirs.174 In marked
contrast, the U.S. system only makes definitive provision for the
surviving spouse, in the case of Wang, the individual who was most able
to take care of herself.175 American jurisdictions do not recognize
parental rights to an intestate share unless there is no surviving spouse

168. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1231; ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO JICHENG FA QUANSHI [ANNOTATED P.R.C. INHERITANCE LAW] 94-95 (Zhou
Xianqi ed., 1995) [hereinafter ANNOTATED INHERITANCE LAW].
169. P.R.C. Succession Law Art. 13.
170. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1231; ANNOTATED
INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 168.
171. Id.
172. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1232.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1231.
175. Id.
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and no issue.176 Remarkably, the ten-year-old daughter would not even
receive a share under the UPC’s “conduit theory.”177
In a similar Article 13 ruling, a Guangdong court considered the
estate of Cen Huaan, the owner of a furniture store, who died intestate
with four first-order heirs.178 Huaan was survived by his wife, his fiveyear-old boy, and his parents. Instead of distributing the estate equally
four ways, the court made a careful determination about the relative need
of the heirs: “[Decedent’s parents] currently have several fishponds
under contract and they are relatively well-to-do; [decedent’s spouse] is
in the prime of her life and is able to work . . . [Decedent’s son] is only
five years old and is not yet able to work.”179 Citing Article 13, the court
reapportioned the estate, supporting the minor child with almost seventyfive percent of the estate.180
While Articles 10 and 12 of the P.R.C. Inheritance Law elevate
extended family members (such as stepchildren, stepparents, and
widowed sons- and daughters-in-law) to direct heirs, Chinese courts
have also granted judicial remedies for non-heir dependents outside of
the immediate or extended family.181 As defined above,182 such
protections are extended through Article 14’s “appropriate share”
provisions.183
G. Estate of Ping
The decedent, Yu Ping, died intestate survived by two heirs: his
elderly spouse and his able-bodied son.184 Yu became aware of the
circumstances of an impoverished old man in the countryside and for
more than a decade had voluntarily donated ten Yuan per month to the

176. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (2010).
177. Id. The “conduit theory” justifies allocation of the entire estate to a surviving spouse
in the event that any existing issue of the decedent are also issue of the spouse. In these
circumstances, it is thought that the spouse can be relied upon as a “conduit” to pass inherited
wealth to the children upon his or her own death. E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of
Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1078 (1999).
178. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1233. See Case No. 430, MIN
SHANG FA XIN LEIXING ANLI JINGXI [Essential Analysis of New Types of Civil and
Commercial Law Cases] 1216, 1216 (Liu Zhixin et al. eds., 1996).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1237.
182. See supra Section III.D.2.
183. P.R.C. Succession Law Art. 14.
184. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1238. See Yu Hu v. Wang
Chunlan, JICHENG FA ANLI XIANGJIE [Detailed Explanation of Inheritance Cases] 220 (Cui
Qinglan & Tang Jing eds., 1990) [hereinafter Detailed Explanation of Inheritance Cases].
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old man’s cause.185 The court was able to exercise its substantial
discretion and award shares to all. Applying Article 10, the judge was
able to reallocate the two heirs’ half portions to reflect the needs of the
parties.186 As a result, the elderly widow’s share was substantially
increased at the expense of the able-bodied son.187 The court then
applied Article 14, granting intestate rights to the old man based on his
inability to work, lack of income, and reliance on the decedent’s
support.188 Despite his non-heir status, the old man was rescued from
certain financial disaster by the court, which granted him a five hundred
Yuan cash legacy.189
Here, the court found an Article 14-mandated “support
relationship” in financial assistance and was therefore able to assign a
cash award to the old man.190 In practice, Chinese courts have wide
latitude to infer support relationships in a variety of contexts, including
the rearing of a child, physical and emotional care, and cohabitation.191
Foster states,
[u]nlike their U.S. counterparts, Chinese courts are not ‘handcuffed’
by rigid intestacy rules. They have the flexibility to determine on a
case-by-case basis the distribution that best reflects the individual
needs of the claimant, circumstances of intestate heirs, overall nature
and size of the estate, and actual services rendered by the
decedent.192

Indeed, an American Court would be forced to ignore relative
circumstances and apply rigid, status-based rules resulting in a formulaic
distribution.193 This result would leave the old man out in the cold,
ultimately to be supported by state welfare.194
H. The Shortcomings of Stare Decisis
Indisputably, “Chinese courts are more concerned with substantive
justice than with consistent results.”195 That consistency, however, is the
185. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1238. See Detailed Explanation
of Inheritance Cases, supra note 184.
186. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1239.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Id.; see Detailed Explanation of Inheritance Cases, supra note 184.
190. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1239.
191. Id. at 1238.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Simmons, supra note 31, at 147 (citing John J. Capowski, China’s Evidentiary and
Procedural Reforms, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Harmonization of Civil and
Common Law, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 455, 473 (2012)).
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very hallmark of the American legal system.196 The principle that binds
judges to precedent is known as stare decisis.197 Common law systems,
like the United States emphasize the concept of stare decisis to ensure
consistent application of rules, whereby similar facts yield similar
outcomes.198
For proponents of the American system, Chinese judicial discretion
represents a “terrible price” to pay for improved support provisions.199
Such redistribution schemes are complex, unpredictable, and perhaps
even fundamentally unsuited to the United States environment.200 They
would encourage litigation, increase costs, and pose a threat to family
amity by incentivizing the airing of a family’s “dirty laundry” in court.201
Essential to critics’ analysis of the Chinese system, judicial discretion is
a direct assault on the “cherished notions of testamentary freedom” and
stare decisis.202 The traditional and peculiar distrust that many
Americans have for government has led to a wholesale suspicion of both
courts and the practice of “legislating from the bench.”203 But courts can
do just as much harm through inaction.204 That stare decisis does, in
fact, impede equity and justice can be seen in the application of a
statutory intestacy-adjustment formula in the following case.205
I. Estate of Moyer
Moyer concerns the regrettable death of a toddler in a car
accident.206 An emotional legal battle ensued between the child’s mother
and his grandmother.207 For all intents and purposes, the mother had
abandoned the child.208 Consequently. the grandmother claimed that
such dereliction of family duty should result in the mother’s
disinheritance.209 As is typical of American courts, the trial judge
expressed ostensible regret at the ruling but insisted that precedent bound
its ruling.210 The decision read: “if this court were free to base its
196. Id.
197. Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
198. See id.
199. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1214.
200. Id. at 1215.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 185 (2007).
204. See Simmons, supra note 31, at 147.
205. Id.
206. In re Estate of Moyer, 758 A.2d 206, 207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
207. Id. at 206-07.
208. See id. at 209-10.
209. Id. at 207.
210. Id. at 210.
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decision on fairness and common sense rather than appellant precedent,
we would sign a forfeiture order as soon as it could be prepared.”211
Ultimately, the court interpreted the statutory phrase “failed to provide
any duty of support” in a stringently literal manner, and found for the
mother, acknowledging “any crumb a parent [threw] in front of [the]
child.”212
The outcome in Moyer serves to remind us of the dire consequences
that unchecked stare decisis can have on our intestacy system. A fixed
system of formulas can never provide the requisite human element
necessary to ensure simple common sense results in inheritance
battles.213 Note that in this case, the rigid application of the statutory
formula actually flew in the face of presumed testamentary intent.214
Though a toddler’s mind remains a mysterious thing, the court found it
exceedingly likely that the boy would have wanted his loving
grandmother to inherit the estate rather than the mother he never knew.215
Thus, the inelastic nature of stare decisis creates perverse outcomes
where the unworthy can, and do, inherit through statutory loopholes.
IV. ANALYSIS
The status quo of American intestacy law is insufficient to provide
broad support to the population and therefore fails its modern directive
of replacing the social welfare system.216 Reforms to the system have
been trivial at best and have not reached the root of the problem—the
inherent bias in favor of the traditional American family, which places
undue value on family status while disregarding support for the
marginalized.217 Fundamentally, the law has failed to “adapt to the
changing American family” and the very real relationships underpinning
it.218
Intestacy rules are formulaic and one-size-fits-all, where presumed
majoritarian intent preys upon actual testamentary intent.219 Lawmakers
have determined that most Americans would prefer their estate to pass
only to immediate family members in an ordered rubric, but such a
notion may be a relic from the past.220 By limiting intestate heirs to
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Moyer, 758 A.2d at 210.
Id.
See Foster, supra note 39.
See Moyer, 758 A.2d at 210.
See id.
See Foster, supra note 39, at 271.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 201.
Simmons, supra note 31, at 127-28.
Id. at 128.
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“natural objects of the decedent’s bounty,” courts and legislatures alike
have funneled the benefits of the intestacy scheme to an ever-dwindling
portion of the population.221 As such, the Family Paradigm itself
represents a form of judicial discretion in favor of the traditional
American family unit.
The UPC admittedly made strides in recognizing “kindred of halfblood”222 and adopted children223 but regrettably, only a handful of states
have passed laws of their own to that effect.224 Accordingly, our
definition of children for intestacy purposes remains outdated.225 Even
those states that have adopted UPC provisions still do not recognize nonmarital children, children of unmarried cohabitants, or any non-related
individuals in a child-parent relationship with the decedent.226 The
definition of spouse also remains woefully outmoded.227 Commentators
have called for the inclusion of committed partners and even non-blood
relatives,228 and many wish to expand the boundaries of the traditional
family paradigm altogether to provide for the decedent’s close family
and friends, like in China.229
Such rigid classifications provide opportunities for unworthy heirs
to slip through the cracks and inherit windfalls. Allowing a wrongdoer
to profit from wrongdoing effectively dismisses the most important
societal purpose of intestacy, that of support.230 Linking support with
inheritance can only benefit the decedent and the survivor by
incentivizing a two-way support system. Progress in America has been
slow on this front, apart from Slayer Statutes.231 But even Slayer rules
are too inflexible to be practical, as many states restrict their application
to cases in which the killing is felonious and intentional.232 Thus, many
statutes do not apply to those who commit abuse, neglect, or

221. See Foster, supra note 39, at 271.
222. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-107 (2010).
223. Id. § 2-114 (2010).
224. Uniform Law Commission: The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, UNIFORMLAWS.COM,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Probate%20Code (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
225. Foster, supra note 39, at 228.
226. See id. at 228-29.
227. See id. at 229.
228. See Susan N. Gary, The Probate Definition of Family: A Proposal for Guided
Discretion in Intestacy, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 787, 787 (2012).
229. See id.
230. See Brown, supra note 79.
231. Id. at 558.
232. Laurel Sevier, Kooky Collects: How the Conflict Between Law and Psychiatry
Grants Inheritance Rights to California’s Mentally Ill Slayers, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 379,
387 (2007).
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exploitation, so long as the killing was not intentional.233 With reports
of escalating elder abuse and neglect within the American family,234 such
statutes are wholly under-inclusive.235
Some progress has been made in other areas of the unworthy heir
doctrine, but successes are few and far between. North Carolina has
attempted to link inheritance with support and merit in the area of child
abandonment.236 Section 31A-2 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina bars a parent from inheriting through intestacy or sharing in a
wrongful death claim if he abandons the child.237 California law deals
with the issue of “deadbeat dads” through its UPC provision:
If a child is born out of wedlock, . . . a natural parent . . . [does not
inherit] from or through the child on the basis of the parent and child
relationship between that parent and the child unless both of the
following requirements are satisfied:
(a) The parent or relative of the parent acknowledged the child.
(b) The parent or relative of the parent contributed to the support or the care of
238
the child.

These examples remain the exception, not the norm. Finally, the
issue of “laughing heirs” remains a substantial problem.239 Claimants
who may not have even met the decedent receiving awards at the
expense of loyal caregivers does not satisfy our aim of justice. Scholars
agree that intestate laws should limit succession at the second collateral
line.240 Unfortunately, many states still have not adopted the UPC
recommendation in their codes.241
Professor Friedman sums up the state of U.S. intestacy
appropriately:
It does not matter . . . whether one [heir] is rich and another poor;
one a minor, one not; one blind and destitute, another not—they

233. Linda K. Kisabeth, Slayer Statutes and Elder Abuse: Good Intentions, Right Results?
Does Michigan’s Amended Slayer Statute Do Enough to Protect the Elderly?, 26 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 373, 374 (2013) (analyzing Washington, Michigan, and Kentucky jurisdictions that
did add such language).
234. Foster, supra note 39, at 230.
235. Id.
236. Heyward D. Armstrong, In re Estate of Lunsford and Statutory Ambiguity: Trying
to Reconcile Child Abandonment and the Intestate Succession Act, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1149,
1150 (2003).
237. Id. at 1149-50.
238. Monopoli, supra note 87, at 263.
239. See generally DeRosa, supra note 18, at 153.
240. Id. at 161.
241. Uniform Law Commission: The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, UNIFORMLAWS.COM,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Probate%20Code (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
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share equally in the estate. No discretion to alter the scheme is vested
in the probate court or in any other legal agency.242

Support of dependents is not only dismissed; it is discouraged.243
Where courts have no power to decide personal matters of intestacy
according to individual need and merit, unjust results will continue to
transpire.
V. PROPOSAL
The intestacy status quo is not only unreasonable, it is economically
unsustainable in the long-term.244 As a country of immigrants, we can
no longer afford our narrow and overly formalistic definition of family
that excludes such a large portion of our populace from intestate
succession.245
I propose adopting support-based reforms to help situate America
more in line with the civil law tradition. The UPC represents a marked
improvement from common law, in that it dramatically expands the
definition of family and prevents laughing heirs. However, it has only
been adopted in seventeen states.246 If we truly want consistency, the
Uniform Probate Code must be uniform. That would mean larger states,
such as California, New York, and Texas, substantially adopting the
provisions to lend legitimacy to the scheme.
Furthermore, the UPC support provisions must be expanded, using
what some have referred to as a “functional approach,” whereby the rigid
Family Paradigm is appended with a scheme that focuses on the quality
of the relationship, instead of categorical status.247 We can use the
functional approach to expand the scope of the unworthy heir doctrine
beyond merely slayers. The California “deadbeat dad” statute
referenced above serves to illustrate this approach.248 By coupling the
“act of becoming a parent” (birth or adoption) with “the act of being a
parent” (care and nurturing), we can tie inheritance to merit and curb
child abandonment.249

242. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property,
Succession and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 354 (1966) (describing situations in which a
decedent dies intestate survived by only his siblings).
243. See Foster, supra note 39, at 204.
244. See Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103.
245. See id.
246. Uniform Law Commission: The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, UNIFORMLAWS.COM,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Probate%20Code (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
247. Foster, supra note 39, at 232.
248. Monopoli, supra note 87, at 263.
249. See Foster, supra note 39, at 232.
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Similarly, the United States system could extend this thinking to the
issue of elderly dependents. No longer would neglectful and abusive
children get to inherit for their misdeeds.250 These reforms would
incentivize the support of the decedent by forcing caregivers into
submission for fear of disinheritance. Such reforms would also
encourage support of the dependent survivors, by allowing for a
functional, relationship-based approach in determining qualifying heirs.
Perhaps most importantly, this approach allows America to retain its
common law tradition. Rather than overhauling the American system to
fit a foreign model, it should acknowledge the centrality of the
traditional—American family—while also recognizing that additional
deserving recipients of the decedent’s estate might exist.251
Additionally, instead of a mandatory share for heirs in the mold of
Article 19 of the P.R.C. Inheritance Law, America should attempt to
replicate Article 14, its corollary, by extending inheritance to non-family
heirs. Unlike Article 19, Article 14 merely provides a forum for heirs
and non-heirs alike to make a claim for an intestate share.252 No shares
are forced upon the decedent; therefore her testamentary freedom is
preserved while ensuring a hearing in equity to resolve disputes.253
Courts could expand their narrow definition of a “natural” recipient and
develop a “support relationship with decedent” standard, much like
Article 14.254 This new judicial principle would bolster support to both
the decedent during her lifetime and to her needy survivors.255
Finally, caregivers could be regarded as “natural objects of a
decedent’s bounty.”256 The idea being an expansion of the pool of
potential heirs, so Americans may more fully realize testamentary
freedom. A testator’s attempt to reward good behavior would no longer
be perceived as a coerced act.257 Removing the presumption in favor of
undue influence might strip the Family Paradigm of its bias and
ultimately restore genuine donative freedom.258 Finally, the United
States should introduce automatic forfeiture provisions to induce care of
the decedent by the heir.259 Examples include if the heir was a slayer, if
250. See Moskowitz, supra note 24, at 452-53.
251. Foster, supra note 39, at 256.
252. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1228.
253. Hsu, supra note 124, at 308.
254. Foster, supra note 39, at 255; P.R.C. Succession Law Art. 14.
255. Foster, supra note 39, at 255.
256. Id. at 253.
257. See id. at 256.
258. Id.
259. See Hsu, supra note 124, at 331 (representing Taiwan’s mandatory share doctrine as
an interesting alternative to China’s in that parents are allowed to disinherit their children if
any of the automatic forfeiture provisions are violated).
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the heir committed fraud in wills proceedings, if the heir forged or
destroyed decedent’s will, and if the heir seriously abused or humiliated
the decedent and has been forbidden from inheriting.260
Ultimately, a pure mandatory share is unworkable, such that many
scholars now question the efficacy of China’s Article 19 scheme.261
China claims that its mandatory share triggers support functions but such
a claim is questionable at best.262 First, meeting both burdens of “unable
to work” and “no income” is rarely done.263 Second, if an heir does not
meet both burdens, the testator is free to disinherit.264 Third, Article 19’s
“necessary portion” only takes into account ability to work and income,
disregarding the actual poverty of a potential heir.265 Accordingly, the
current provisions may be contrary to family support by providing
insufficient protections to needy heirs, leaving society to carry the
burden.266 Indeed, many decedents often leave their estates to nonfamily heirs.267
Finally, despite the “frightening” prospect of a judicial discretion
scheme in the United States,268 such a system represents an eminently
plausible way of ensuring social support functions through private
actors. An American family maintenance model would allow for
equitable distribution of an estate on a case-by-case basis.269 Critics
point to an assault on testamentary freedom,270 but the majoritarian intent
of the testator is ultimately better realized when a court can remedy
common sense injustices and provide for the public welfare.
It should be noted that this scheme does not apply automatically
and is only administered upon petition by qualifying claimants.271
Furthermore, a testator is always free to opt out of the default scheme
and make her bequest by will.272 Indeed, in a case upholding the validity
of a duly executed will, the Chinese legal analysis states, “[i]t should be
made clear that even if an heir performed duties toward the decedent, the
decedent can, nonetheless, make a will leaving his or her estate to
260. Id. at 312-13.
261. Id. at 308.
262. See id. at 304.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See Hsu, supra note 124, at 304.
266. Hsu, supra note 124, at 323.
267. Id. at 322.
268. Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 103, at 1215.
269. Id. at 1214.
270. Id. at 1215.
271. Id. at 1214.
272. Foster, supra note 39, at 206. The accepted orthodoxy of intestate succession
generally paints the system as one of default. See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and
Other Donative Transfers § 2.1 cmt. c (1999).
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another person. To be effective, the will need only conform with the
requirements stipulated in the Inheritance Law.”273 Thus, the available
opt-out sufficiently protects a decedent’s interests, especially in relation
to the increased ability of courts on the other hand to provide for the
public welfare.
VI. CONCLUSION
Chinese inheritance law is a complicated convergence of its
Confucian past, socialist present, and increasingly capitalist future.
Despite the passage of time, the notion of family and support have
remained paramount in Chinese society. Such notions exist in America,
only they are manifested in a slightly different manner. Whereas China
emphasizes need and community support, America stresses status and
individual testamentary freedom. Indeed, these concepts do not exist in
isolation but are rather two sides of the same coin, helping to expose our
respective societies’ values and biases.
Over the next few decades each country will face a stiff test of
providing support for their aging populations. China’s system is
considerably more flexible, responsive, and better equipped to deal with
the changing nature of its population in the twenty-first century. China’s
support provisions appear surprisingly practical, indicating that the costs
of unpredictability and postmortem chaos are offset by the benefits of
the scheme’s dual support outcomes.274 Ultimately, it is the human
component that differentiates the yin from the yank, helping us to
“recognize that the ties of human affection do not run solely along family
lines.”275

273. Id. at 1249-50.
274. Simmons, supra note 31, at 148.
275. Foster, supra note 39, at 273.

